HOLLOWAY v. GARLAND et al
| TAMMY ALLISON HOLLOWAY |
| MERRICK GARLAND, COLLETE S. PETERS and LEE LOFTHUS |
| 1:2024cv00226 |
| January 25, 2024 |
| US District Court for the District of Columbia |
| Beryl A Howell |
| Civil Rights: Jobs |
| 42 U.S.C. ยง 2000 e Job Discrimination (Employment) |
| Plaintiff |
Docket Report
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MINUTE ORDER (paperless) DENYING plaintiff's #5 Motion for a CM/ECF Password. Plaintiff's request for a CM/ECF Password is denied without prejudice, for failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 5.4(b)(2), which requires that a pro se party must file a written motion "describing the party's access to the internet, confirming the capacity to file documents and receive filings electronically on a regular basis, and certifying that he or she has successfully completed the entire Clerk's Office on-line tutorial or has been permitted to file electronically in other federal courts." LCvR 5.4(b)(2). Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 22, 2024. (lcbah2)
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| Filing 6 MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to the Complaint by MERRICK GARLAND, LEE LOFTHUS, COLLETE S. PETERS. (Attachments: #1 Text of Proposed Order, #2 Certificate of Service)(Stratton, Kimberly) |
| Filing 5 MOTION for CM/ECF Password by TAMMY ALLISON HOLLOWAY. (mg) |
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Filing 4
STANDING ORDER. Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on January 30, 2024. (lcbah2)
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| Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Submission To The Court due by 2/23/2024. (mac) |
| Filing 3 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by TAMMY ALLISON HOLLOWAY. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: #1 Memorandum in Support, #2 Text of Proposed Order, #3 Exhibit)(mg) |
| Filing 2 Emergency Ex Parte MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by TAMMY ALLISON HOLLOWAY. (Attachments: #1 Memorandum in Support, #2 Text of Proposed Order, #3 Declaration)(mg) . Added MOTION for Preliminary Injunction on 1/25/2024 (mg). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/25/2024: #4 Exhibit) (mg). |
| Filing 1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 405, receipt number 206504) with Jury Demand filed by TAMMY ALLISON HOLLOWAY. (Attachments: #1 Civil Cover Sheet)(mg). |
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MINUTE ORDER (paperless) DENYING plaintiff's #2 Emergency Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. A temporary restraining order ("TRO") "is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." see Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004). An application for a TRO is analyzed using the same factors applicable to a request for preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying the preliminary injunction standard to a district court decision denying a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction). Preliminary injunctive relief is similarly "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish the following four factors: "that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 421 (2022) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). The balance of equities and the public interest factors "merge" when, as here, the government is the opposing party. Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2020). When seeking such relief, "the movant has the burden to show that all four factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction." Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Preliminary injunctive relief and TROs are not remedies "awarded as of right," but "[a]s a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction does not [even] follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff's showing of a likelihood of success on the merits." Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 194344 (2018). Moreover, as relevant here, ex parte relief is disfavored in this jurisdiction, and "[e]xcept in an emergency, the Court will not consider an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order." LCvR 65.1. Plaintiff has failed to establish entitlement to an ex parte TRO in this case. Plaintiff requests "an immediate order to restrain Defendants, their officers, employees, agents, and all persons acting in active concert or participation, from terminating and/or retaliating in any way against Plaintiff as she has engaged in protected activities and disclosures, including but not limited to being a whistleblower." Pl.'s Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction ("Pl.'s TRO") at 2, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff claims this matter became an emergency on December 4, 2023, when her apartment was "violently broken into... without a court date, any warning, notice, or due process of law." Id. Notably, 52 days passed between this "emergency" occurrence and the filing of plaintiff's TRO. Plaintiff explains that she filed this motion ex parte "because Defendants have already retaliated against Plaintiff in the most horrific ways," including "restricting Plaintiff's access" to this Court. Id. at 7. In her memorandum supporting her motion for a TRO, plaintiff makes a litany of further demands for relief from this Court, to include ordering defendants to "stop their unlawful and unconstitutional surveillance" of her, appointing a special master to "investigate the numerous unconstitutional and unlawful actions of Defendants that have impacted Plaintiff's family, her political career, and professional life," and determining "[Attorney General] Garland's conflict due to his Municipal Bonds and Fund ownership in Maryland counties and state." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. TRO ("Pl.'s Mem.") at 1-5, ECF No. 2-1. Given the 52 days that have passed since damage to plaintiff's apartment allegedly occurred, this fails to qualify as an "emergency" justifying relief on an ex parte basis. Moreover, plaintiff fails to satisfy the requisite factors for a TRO or preliminary injunctive relief.First, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate her likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he delay in completing the administrative process in Plaintiff's instant EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity] matter against Defendants is evidence of discrimination and retaliation in and of itself." Id. at 6; see also id. at 9-10. She also claims that she was constructively terminated by defendants after years of discrimination and retaliation, including "her computer equipment constantly not working and being left out of meetings, forced to travel to trainings, being bullied and isolated on the work trip, and having every valid complaint dismissed as meritless by individuals who should have been conflicted out of her employment discrimination complaint." Id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts that, as a result, she resigned from employment with defendants, effective October 30, 2020. Id. She claims, however, that even since her departure, "numerous inexplicable and random events began to occur reminiscent of Defendants' harassment," including neighbors providing her with surveillance footage of unlawful actions by government officials and her purported congressional opponents bragging in public statements. Id. at 8. None of these allegations suffice to indicate a likelihood of success on plaintiff's employment discrimination claim. See id. at 8-14. Plaintiff's empty and conclusory claims that defendants have colluded against her to cause her harm cannot sustain such a claim without any evidence that defendants have been the cause of the harm she has suffered. At this stage of litigation, plaintiff's specious claims fail to establish a likelihood of success that would warrant emergency injunctive relief. Plaintiff's attempt to show that she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO fairs even more poorly. Plaintiff's allegations state that she has not been employed by the defendants since October 2020. Id. at 7. Any assertion that she is at risk of an adverse employment action is thus completely baseless. While plaintiff makes sweeping accusations that defendants are still harassing her more than three years after her resignation, accusing defendants of unlawful surveillance, burglarizing her apartment, blocking her access to worker's compensation pay and health insurance, tampering with her social media, and a myriad of other nefarious acts, none of these claims are substantiated by any evidence in the record. See id. at 7-8, 15-16. Plaintiff has thus undoubtedly failed to demonstrate that she will suffer irreparable harm absent the granting of her TRO. The third and fourth Winter factors, the balance of equities and public interest, merge here, as defendants are government officials sued in their official capacity. Plaintiff fails again to establish that these factors weigh in favor of granting her TRO. The injunctive relief that she requests, including myriad investigations by a special master, would impose a burden on a government agency that is not warranted given the conclusory and seemingly baseless nature of plaintiff's claims. The public interest would not be served by ordering emergency relief in this case. Notably, plaintiff argues in her memorandum supporting her request for a TRO that defendants Merrick Garland and Lee Lofthus should be ordered to recuse themselves, presumably from this lawsuit, due to ethical conflicts she asserts related to their participation. Id. at 18-19. Given that plaintiff herself has sued these defendants, however, her requests for recusal seem, at best, confused and otherwise nonsensical, and such confusion further supports the conclusion that the balance of equities and public interest do not tip in favor of granting her TRO. Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on January 25, 2024. (lcbah2)
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| SUMMONS (4) Issued as to All Defendants and US Attorney (mg) Modified docket text on 1/26/2024 (mg). |
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MINUTE ORDER (paperless) GRANTING plaintiff's #3 Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal ("Pl.'s Mot."); and DIRECTING plaintiff to submit to the Court, by February 23, 2024, a statement identifying precisely which pages of her 294 page exhibit contain personal health information and which pages contain "protected activities and protected disclosures of Plaintiff as a former U.S. Department of Justice Attorney," Pl.'s Mot. at 2, ECF No. 3, and explain why the pages that contain "protected activities and protected disclosures of Plaintiff as a former U.S. Department of Justice Attorney," must remain under seal under the six factors set out in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on January 25, 2024. (lcbah2)
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