June 5, 2014 |
Filing
43
ORDER denying Daker's 32 Motion to Reconsider Court's 1/16/2014 Order and 42 Supplemental Motion to Reconsider Court's 1/16/2014 Order. First, the Court's January 16 Order denied Daker's previous Rule 59(e) Motions to V acate, and this Court's Local Rules prohibit motions to reconsider motions to reconsider. See LR 7.2E, NDGa. Second, the footnote in the January 16 Order that Daker demands be reconsidered and vacated deals with Daker's "strikes" in prior cases and appeals. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit, this Court, and the Middle District of Georgia have all concluded that Daker has accumulated more than three "strikes." Third, there are only two grounds for granting a m otion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e): '''newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.'" Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (l1th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 11 16, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)). Here, Daker has neither presented any new evidence, nor identified any manifest error. Rather, Daker is simply seeking to "relitigate old matters, raise argument, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment," none of which is a basis for relief in a Rule 59(e) motion. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla. 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Daker's "Request for Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal 38 and "Request for Permission to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" on appeal 40 are DENIED because he is ineligible to proceed IFP in new appeals now that he has accumulated more than three strikes, unless he can show that he is "under imminent danger of serious physical harm," which he has not attempted to do in this case, and because, as discussed above, it does not appear that Daker is actually indigent. Once again, Daker is reminded that this Court's Lo cal Rules prohibit the filing of motions for reconsideration as a matter of routine practice and prohibit altogether the filing of "motions to reconsider the court's denial of a prior motion for reconsideration." LR 7.2E, NDGa. If Dake r nonetheless seeks reconsideration of this Order and/or files any new requests to proceed IFP in this Court, he is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in those motions or requests why this Court should not exercise its "discretion to deny or revoke th[e] pri vilege [to proceed IFP]..., either retrospectively or prospectively, by looking to 'the number, content, frequency, and disposition of his previous filings."" Hurt v. SSA, 544 F.3d 308,310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Butler v. DOJ, 492 F .3d 440,445 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In light of Daker's more than seventy prior cases and appeals, it may be appropriate for the Court to now exercise its "more general supervisory authority to manage [its] docket so as to promote[] the interes ts of justice,"" and to limit the waste of judicial resources by prisoners "'for whom litigation [is] a costless pastime.'" Butler, 492 F.3d at 444-45 (quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989), and Ibrahim v. Dis trict of Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). See also In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (denying IFP status to a frequent filer in an extraordinary writ case and noting that he might be similarly restricted from filing IFP in other cases if he abused the privilege). Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 6/5/2014. (cem)
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