CROWDER v. LARIVA et al
RICKY CROWDER |
HOLSTON, JONES, LARIVA and J. OLIVER |
2:2014cv00202 |
July 3, 2014 |
US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana |
Terre Haute Office |
Mark J. Dinsmore |
Jane Magnus-Stinson |
Prisoner Petitions - Prison Condition |
28 U.S.C. ยง 1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act |
Plaintiff |
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Filing 104 Entry Discussing Motion to Dismiss - For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss, dkt. 97 , is granted. Crowder's First Amendment claim is dismissed. This action shall continue to proceed to trial on his claim under RFRA (SEE ENTRY FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION). Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 11/29/2017. Copy to Plaintiff via US Mail. (DW) |
Filing 79 ENTRY Denying Plaintiff Crowder's Motion for Summary Judgment - For the foregoing reasons, Crowder's motion for summary judgment [dkt 67 ] is denied. Jones has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Crowder& #039;s right to practice his religion was violated. The Court will endeavor to recruit an attorney to represent Crowder for the purposes of settlement negotiations. Once an attorney is recruited, the Magistrate Judge will be requested to hold a status conference to direct further proceedings. If he objects to the recruitment of an attorney to represent him, Crowder shall have ten days from the issuance of this Entry to notify the Court (SEE ENTRY). Copy sent to Plaintiff via US Mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 2/21/2017. (DW) |
Filing 65 Entry Discussing Motion for Summary Judgment - Ricky Crowder, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana ("FCC Terre Haute"), brings this action pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA&quo t;) and the theory recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. Crowder alleges that his rights were violated when the defendants denied his request for a kosher diet. Crowder seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. The defendants move for summary judgment and Crowder has responded. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment [dkt 51 ] is granted in part and denied in part. In addition, and as discussed more fully below, because the facts are un disputed, defendant Jones is directed, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to show why summary judgment should not be entered in favor of Crowder on his First Amendment and RFRA claims. The motion is granted as to the claims against defendants LaRiva, Holston, and Oliver because those defendants have shown they had no personal involvement in any of the alleged actions. All claims against LaRiva, Holston, and Oliver are dismissed. The motion is also granted to the extent that no monetary damages may be awarded against any individual defendant in his or her official capacity under RFRA. The motion for summary judgment is in all other respects denied: First, the request that Crowder's claims for injun ctive relief be dismissed as moot is denied because Jones failed to carry his burden to demonstrate the conduct at issue cannot be repeated. Because the claims against all defendants except Jones have been dismissed, Crowder's claim for injun ctive relief shall proceed against Jones in his official capacity. Next, the request for dismissal of Crowder's claims for monetary damages under RFRA against defendant Jones in his individual capacity is denied. Finally, the request for dis missal of Crowder's claims under the First Amendment and RFRA is denied because Jones has failed to show that as a matter of law that Crowder's rights were not violated. Jones shall have through October 4, 2016, to show why summary judg ment should not be entered in favor of Crowder and against Jones as to Jones's liability to Crowder on his First Amendment and RFRA claims. To do so, Jones must identify specific issues of fact which preclude summary judgment and necessitate a trial on Crowder's claims. In addition, also based on the conclusions identified above, the Court finds that Crowder is entitled to relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting any requirement that Crowder submit in the future to a Reli gious Diet Interview, unless he changes his religious preference, and prohibiting the denial to him of the requested kosher diet. The parties shall have through October 4, 2016, to submit proposed language for this injunction. (See Entry.) Copy to Plaintiff via US mail. Signed by Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson on 9/12/2016. (BRR) |
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