Carrizales et al v. Palm Express Inc et al
| Clint Carrizales and Francisco Diaz |
| Palm Express Inc, Elizabeth Clark and Shane Blunt |
| 3:2025cv02191 |
| August 13, 2025 |
| U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas |
| Ed Kinkeade |
| Torts/Pers Inj: Motor Vehicle |
| 23 U.S.C. § 134 P.I.- Auto Negligence |
| Plaintiff |
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Filing 18
ORDER granting #15 Motion to Remand. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 13th Judicial District Court, Navarro County, Texas. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 10/15/2025) (chmb)
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| Filing 17 RESPONSE filed by Shane Blunt re: #15 MOTION to Remand (Schwartz, Fallin) |
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Filing 16
ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (the "Motion") (Doc. No. 15). The Court previously ordered Plaintiffs to file a brief addressing Defendant Shane Blunt's improper joinder argument made in his Notice of Removal, but also expressly stated that Plaintiffs' right to file a motion to remand on any basis was not affected by the order. Doc. No. 14. In that same order, the Court directed Defendant Blunt to file a response within 7 days of Plaintiffs' brief and forbid any further reply by Plaintiffs unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Id. Plaintiffs filed this Motion by the court-ordered deadline to file a brief. Id. (deadline set as September 23, 2025). In their Motion, Plaintiffs address improper joinder, arguing, generally, that remand is required because Defendant Elizabeth Clark was not improperly joined. Because Plaintiffs chose to file a Motion to Remand rather than the brief (which was permissible), the Court enters this Order to clarify the responsive deadlines. Defendant Blunt shall file his response within the time permitted by Local Civil Rule 7.1(e). Plaintiffs may file a reply within the time permitted by Local Civil Rule 7.1 (f). (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 9/24/2025) (chmb)
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| Filing 15 MOTION to Remand filed by Clint Carrizales (Attachments: #1 Exhibit(s) Ex. 1 - Lexis Report, #2 Exhibit(s) Ex. 2 - Declaration) (Armstrong, Scott) |
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Filing 14
ELECTRONIC ORDER: Defendant Shane Blunt removed this case to federal court invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Doc. No. 1 at 3. Defendant Blunt alleges there is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs (Texas citizens) and himself (New Jersey citizen) and Defendant Palm Express, Inc. (California citizen). Id. at 8-11. Defendant Blunt asserts that non-diverse Defendant Elizabeth Clark, who shares the same Texas citizenship as Plaintiffs, was improperly joined and, therefore, can be disregarded for diversity purposes. Doc. No. 1 at 3-8.When a defendant alleges removal is proper because of the district court's diversity jurisdiction, the removed action must (1) involve a controversy exceeding $75,000 and (2) be between citizens of different states or between citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A further subset of rules governs cases where the parties are not completely diverse but the removing defendant argues that the non-diverse defendant was "improperly joined." See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 57276 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). When improper joinder has been alleged, the court's "first inquiry is whether the removing party has carried its heavy burden of proving that the joinder was improper." Id. at 576. Until the removing party satisfies its burden, "the court does not have the authority to do more; it lacks the jurisdiction to dismiss the case on its merits." Id. If the removing defendant meets its heavy burden, then the court must dismiss the claims against the improperly joinder defendant without prejudice. Alviar v. Lillard, 854 F.3d 286, 29192 (5th Cir. 2017). However, if the "defendant fails to prove the joinder improper, then diversity is not complete, the diverse defendant is not entitled to remove, and remand is mandated." Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 575.Because Defendant Blunt argues in his Notice of Removal that Plaintiffs improperly joined Defendant Clark, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to file a brief within 14 days of this Order addressing (1) whether Defendant Clark was improperly joined to this action and (2) the effect, if any, on this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In lieu of filing a brief, Plaintiffs may file a notice of dismissal as to Defendant Clark. If Plaintiffs do file a brief, Defendant Blunt may file a response within 7 days. Plaintiffs may not file a reply brief unless otherwise ordered by the Court. If Plaintiffs fail to respond, the Court will construe their silence as conceding that Defendant Clark was improperly joined and the Court will dismiss Defendant Clark without prejudice and without further notice.This Order does not preclude or otherwise affect Plaintiffs' right to file a motion to remand under the applicable law. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 9/9/2025) (chmb)
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| Filing 13 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Shane Blunt. Amendment to #10 Amended Document, #1 Notice of Removal,,,,,. . (Attachments: #1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, #2 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, #3 Exhibit(s) Ex. C, #4 Exhibit(s) Ex. D, #5 Exhibit(s) Ex. E, #6 Exhibit(s) Ex. F, #7 Exhibit(s) Ex. G, #8 Exhibit(s) Ex. H, #9 Exhibit(s) Ex. I, #10 Exhibit(s) Ex. J, #11 Exhibit(s) Ex. K) (Schwartz, Fallin) |
| Filing 12 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance of Local Counsel by John Holman Barr on behalf of Shane Blunt. ***FILED USING EMERGENCY FILING EMAIL*** (cea) |
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Filing 11
ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Court is in receipt of Defendant Shane Blunt's Amended Notice of Removal and Request [sic] Leave to Conduct Jurisdictional Discovery (Doc. No. 10). Despite the amended Notice of Removal, Defendant Blunt still fails to distinctly and affirmatively allege Plaintiff Francisco Diaz's citizenship and, consequently, this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant Blunt makes the conclusory assertion that Plaintiff Diaz is a citizen of Texas based solely on his residence. Doc. No. 10 at 9-10. Further, the Court will not make any assumptions regarding the citizenship of Plaintiff Diaz despite Defendant Blunt's suggestion to do so. Id. at 10 ("Assuming, that by stating he is from Dallas, Plaintiff Diaz was born there, his domicile appears to have always been and remains in Texas."). As the Court stated in its previous order (Doc. No. 7), Defendant Blunt, the party seeking the federal forum, bears the burden of establishing the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, which he fails to do on this amended Notice of Removal. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenburg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court recognizes that Defendant Blunt asks for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery regarding Plaintiff Diaz. However, this requested relief must be made by a separate motion to the Court with supporting legal authority for his request. By September 8, 2025, Defendant Blunt may either file a motion for jurisdictional discovery OR may amend his notice of removal to properly allege the citizenship of Plaintiff Diaz. Defendant Blunt shall ensure that he properly confers with opposing regarding the relief sought.If Defendant Blunt fails to file the motion or amended notice of removal, the Court will remand this case without further notice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (in action removed from state court, federal court must remand case any time before final judgment if court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction); see Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The removal statute is therefore to be strictly construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand."). (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/27/2025) (chmb)
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| Filing 10 AMENDED NOTICE OF REMOVAL by Shane Blunt. Request to Conduct Jurisdictional Discovery. (Attachments: #1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, #2 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, #3 Exhibit(s) Ex. C, #4 Exhibit(s) Ex. D, #5 Exhibit(s) Ex. E, #6 Exhibit(s) Ex. F, #7 Exhibit(s) Ex. G, #8 Exhibit(s) Ex. H, #9 Exhibit(s) Ex. I) (Schwartz, Fallin) Modified text on 8/22/2025 (kxm). |
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Filing 9
ELECTRONIC ORDER:Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Local Counsel (Doc. No. 8). Based on the representations in the Motion related to Attorney Adam M. Grable's residence, Plaintiffs are not required to have local counsel pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.10(a). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion.Mr. Grable SHALL notify the Court in writing of any changes to his residence such that he no longer resides in this District within ten (10) days of said change. If for any reason Mr. Grable withdraws from this case, Plaintiffs will be required to file the entry of appearance of local counsel within 2 weeks of his withdrawal. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/15/2025) (chmb)
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| Filing 8 MOTION to proceed without Local Counsel filed by Clint Carrizales (Armstrong, Scott) |
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Filing 7
ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Court has "an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). "When jurisdiction depends on citizenship, citizenship must be 'distinctly and affirmatively alleged.'" Getty Oil Corp., a Div. of Texaco v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988). Defendant Shane Blunt removed this case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1332(a). Doc. No. 1 at 3. As reflected in the Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1 at 8-9), Defendant Blunt clearly understands that the citizenship of a natural person "is determined by domicile, which requires residency plus an intent to make the place of residency one's permanent home." SXSW, L.L.C. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (citing Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 568-69 (1915)). Yet, Defendant Blunt reasons that "Plaintiffs' have plead that they reside in Navarro County, Texas. There should be no dispute that Plaintiffs' are Texas Citizens." Id. at 9. As for Plaintiff Clint Carrizales, Defendant Blunt does state that Plaintiff Carrizales has a Texas driver's license with a Texas address, thus supporting that he is indeed a Texas citizen. Id. However, as for Plaintiff Francisco Diaz, Defendant Blunt alleges that "No facts are known to Defendant regarding Plaintiff Diaz other than that plaintiff plead he is a resident of Texas. Therefore, Plaintiffs are Texas citizens." Id.; see id. at 2 ("As noted, Plaintiffs pleaded that they reside in Navarro County, Texas. As such, Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Texas."). Defendant Blunt submits no other allegations or evidence to establish the citizenship of Plaintiff Diaz. Further, the Court recognizes that Defendant Blunt asserts that Defendant Elizabeth Clark was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 3-8. However, although he claims Defendant Clark is non-diverse, Defendant Blunt merely alleges that "Defendant Clark is plead to be a resident of Texas." Id. at 3 (citing state court petition).The Fifth Circuit has consistently reaffirmed that "[a]n allegation of residency alone 'does not satisfy the requirement of an allegation of citizenship.'" SXSW, L.L.C. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984)); see, e.g., MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019); Neely v. Bankers Tr. Co. of Tex., 757 F.2d 621, 634 n.18 (5th Cir. 1985); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954). As the Fifth Circuit explained, "The difference between citizenship and residency is a frequent source of confusion. For individuals, 'citizenship has the same meaning as domicile,' and 'the place of residence is prima facie the domicile.' Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954). Nevertheless, '[c]itizenship and residence, as often declared by this court, are not synonymous terms.' Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648, 24 L.Ed. 1057 (1878). Citizenship requires not only ' [r]esidence in fact' but also 'the purpose to make the place of residence one's home. ' Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939). Therefore, an allegation of residency alone 'does not satisfy the requirement of an allegation of citizenship.'" Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see MidCap Media, 929 F.3d at 313; see also Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In determining a litigant's domicile, the court must address a variety of factors" which include "the places where the litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes, owns real and personal property, has drivers and other licenses, maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs and churches, has places of business or employment, and maintains a home for his family.").As the party seeking the federal forum, Defendant Blunt bears the burden of establishing the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenburg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998). Defendant Blunt failed to allege the citizenship of Plaintiff Diaz and Defendant Clark "distinctly and affirmatively" and, therefore, the Court cannot determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259. Defendant Blunt may amend his Notice of Removal in accordance with this Order by August 21, 2025. If Defendant Blunt fails to amend or fails to do so sufficiently, the Court will remand this case without further notice. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (in action removed from state court, federal court must remand case any time before final judgment if court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction); see Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The removal statute is therefore to be strictly construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.").This Order in no way precludes or affects the rights of Plaintiff Carrizales and/or Plaintiff Diaz to file a timely motion to remand on any basis permitted by statute. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/14/2025) (chmb)
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Filing 6
ORDER: This Order governs requests to file materials in this case under seal. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/14/2025) (chmb)
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Filing 5
ELECTRONIC ORDER: Local Civil Rule 83.10(a) requires the appearance of local counsel where the attorney of record for a party does not reside or maintain their principal office in this district. By August 28, 2025, Plaintiffs and Defendants, shall file the entry of appearance of local counsel who satisfies the requirements of Local Civil Rule 83.10(a). Further, upon said appearance, the undersigned requires local counsel to sign all documents filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The undersigned's Judge Specific Requirements can be found at https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/district-judge-ed-kinkeade. Failure to comply this Order may result in sanctions being imposed. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/14/2025) (chmb)
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Filing 4
STANDING ORDER: This Court requires all counsel of record to review and comply with the undersigned's Judge Specific Requirements as well as the Local Civil Rules for the Northern District of Texas upon making an appearance in a matter before this Court. These can be found at # Judge Specific Requirements and # Local Civil Rules . Further, counsel shall refer to this Court's Judge Specific Requirements and the Local Civil Rules prior to calling chambers with any questions. The Court calls specific attention to Local Civil Rule 7.2(f), which addresses the disclosure of the use of generative artificial intelligence, and Local Civil Rule 83.10, which address the requirement of local counsel. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 8/13/2025) (ndt)
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| Filing 3 New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge (Judge McKay). Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (ndt) |
| Filing 2 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Shane Blunt. (Clerk QC note: No affiliate entered in ECF). (Schwartz, Fallin) |
| Filing 1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL WITH JURY DEMAND filed by Shane Blunt. (Filing fee $405; receipt number ATXNDC-15735721) In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the # Judges Copy Requirements and # Judge Specific Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms and Instructions found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: # Attorney Information - Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: #1 Cover Sheet Civil Cover Sheet, #2 Exhibit(s) Ex. A, #3 Exhibit(s) Ex. B, #4 Exhibit(s) Ex. C, #5 Exhibit(s) Ex. D, #6 Declaration(s) Ex. E, #7 Declaration(s) Ex. F, #8 Exhibit(s) Ex. G, #9 Exhibit(s) Ex. H) (Schwartz, Fallin) (Attachment 1 replaced to flatten on 8/14/2025) (ndt). |
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